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Bayesian	  Process	  Networks:	  	  
An	  Approach	  to	  Systemic	  Process	  Risk	  Analysis	  by	  Mapping	  Process	  
Models	  onto	  Bayesian	  Networks	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Abstract:	  This	  paper	  presents	  an	  approach	  to	  mapping	  a	  process	  model	  onto	  a	  Bayesian	  network	  resulting	  in	  a	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network,	  which	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  process	  risk	  analysis.	  Exemplified	  by	   the	  model	  of	  Event-­‐driven	  Process	  Chains,	   it	   is	  demonstrated	  how	   a	   process	   model	   can	   be	   mapped	   onto	   an	   isomorphic	   Bayesian	   network,	   thus	  creating	  a	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	  Process	  events,	   functions,	  objects,	  and	  operators	  are	   mapped	   onto	   random	   variables,	   and	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   between	   these	   are	  represented	   by	   appropriate	   conditional	   probabilities.	   Since	   process	   risks	   can	   be	  regarded	  as	  deviations	  of	   the	  process	   from	   its	   reference	  state,	  all	  process	  risks	  can	  be	  mapped	   onto	   risk	   states	   of	   the	   random	   variables.	   By	   example,	  we	   show	   how	   process	  risks	  can	  be	  specified,	  evaluated,	  and	  analysed	  by	  means	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	  The	  results	  reveal	  that	  the	  approach	  presented	  herein	  is	  a	  simple	  technique	  for	  enabling	  systemic	  process	  risk	  analysis	  because	   the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network	  can	  be	  designed	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  existing	  process	  model.	  	  	  
Keywords:	  process	  models;	  process	  modelling;	  process	  chains;	  risk	  management;	  risk	  analysis;	  risk	  assessment;	  risk	  models;	  Bayesian	  networks;	  isomorphic	  mapping.	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1.	  	   Introduction	  	  With	   the	  work	  of	  Thomas	  Davenport	   in	   the	   early	  90s,	   process	  management	  became	  a	  highly	  recognized	  discipline	  of	  business	  management.	  According	  to	  Davenport	  (1993,	  p.	  19),	   a	   process	   is	   ‘a	   specific	   ordering	   of	   work	   activities	   across	   time	   and	   place,	   with	   a	  beginning,	  an	  end,	  and	  clearly	  identified	  inputs	  and	  outputs:	  a	  structure	  for	  action.’	  The	  internationally	   recognized	  quality	  management	  standard	   ISO	  9001	  demands	  a	  process	  oriented	   management	   approach,	   which	   ‘involves	   the	   systematic	   definition	   and	  management	  of	  processes,	  and	  their	  interactions,	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  the	  intended	  results	  in	  accordance	   with	   the	   quality	   policy	   and	   strategic	   direction	   of	   the	   organization’	   (DIN	  2015b,	  p.	  11).	  	  With	  the	  latest	  revision	  of	  this	  standard,	  a	  further	  focus	  was	  placed	  on	  risk	  management.	  ‘Management	   of	   the	   processes	   and	   the	   system	   as	   a	   whole	   can	   be	   achieved	   using	   the	  PDCA	  cycle…with	  an	  overall	  focus	  on	  risk-­‐based	  thinking…aimed	  at	  taking	  advantage	  of	  opportunities	   and	   preventing	   undesirable	   results’	   (DIN	   2015b,	   p.	   11).	   ‘Risk-­‐based	  thinking	  enables	  an	  organization	  to	  determine	  the	  factors	  that	  could	  cause	  its	  processes	  and	  its	  quality	  management	  system	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  planned	  results,	  to	  put	  in	  place	  preventive	   controls	   to	   minimize	   negative	   effects	   and	   to	   make	   maximum	   use	   of	  opportunities	   as	   they	   arise’	   (DIN	   2015b,	   p.	   9).	   Possible	  measures	   to	   implement	   these	  requirements	   have	   to	   ‘ensure	   the	   necessary	   information	   is	   available	   to	   operate	   and	  improve	   the	   processes	   and	   to	   monitor,	   analyse	   and	   evaluate	   the	   performance	   of	   the	  overall	  system’	  (DIN	  2015a,	  p.	  18).	  While	  process	  risk	  management	  is	  strictly	  demanded,	  specifications	  as	  how	  to	  do	  this	  is,	  however,	  are	  not	  made.	  Organisations,	  therefore,	  can	  and	  must	  decide	  what	  methods	  and	  tools	  they	  implement	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  risk-­‐based	  process	  control	  adequately.	  	  As	  part	  of	  a	  project	  to	  develop	  standards	  for	  a	  unified	  process	  specification	  language	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Standards	  and	  Technology	  has	  rated	  the	  capability	  of	  describing	  the	  stochastic	  properties	  of	   a	  process	   to	  be	  useful	  but	  not	   essential	   for	  process	  modelling	  (Schlenoff	   et	   al.	   1996,	   p.	   13,	   pp.	   26-­‐27).	   Against	   the	   background	   of	   an	   increasing	  importance	   of	   risk	   management,	   various	   approaches	   by	   several	   authors	   to	  systematically	  integrating	  risk	  information	  into	  process	  models	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  following	  years,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  outlined	  below.	  	  Rosemann	   and	   Zur	   Muehlen	   (2005)	   stated	   that	   a	   suitable	   process	   risk	   model	   has	   to	  consider	   the	   individual	   risks	   as	   well	   as	   the	   cumulative	   risks,	   the	   impact	   of	   risks	   on	  process	  goals,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  risks	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cause-­‐effect	  chains.	  To	  meet	   some	   of	   these	   requirements,	   they	   extended	   the	   model	   of	   Event-­‐driven	   Process	  Chains	   	   (EPC)	  by	   introducing	  risk	   icons	   that	  are	   linked	   to	   the	   functions	  of	   the	  process	  model.	  Cope	  et	  al.	  (2010a)	  extended	  the	  BPMN	  process	  model	  by	  representing	  risks	  as	  events	   that	   directly	   affect	   the	   process	   resources,	   thereby	   indirectly	   affecting	   the	  performance	  and	  costs	  of	  the	  process.	  Moreover,	  their	  approach	  additionally	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  specifying	  the	  cause-­‐effect	  relationships	  between	  risk	  events.	  The	  authors	  pointed	   out	   the	   potential	   of	   transforming	   their	   risk-­‐extended	   process	   model	   into	   a	  Bayesian	  network,	  which	  could	   then	  be	  used	   for	   further	  quantitative	  risk	  analysis,	  but	  left	  this	  approach	  to	  future	  research	  (Cope	  et	  al.	  2010b,	  p.	  3).	  	  Betz	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  provided	  suggested	  a	  concept	  of	  using	  process	  models	  for	  risk	  analysis	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Petri	  nets.	  According	  to	  their	  suggestion,	  every	  process	  risk	  is	  caused	  by	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the	  unavailability	  of	  some	  resource	  properties.	  The	  quantity	  and	  quality	  demands	  on	  the	  resources	   of	   a	   process	   are	   specified	   as	   enabling	   conditions	   for	   activities.	   If	   these	  conditions	   are	   violated	   by	   risk	   events,	   the	   activity	   in	   question	   won’t	   be	   executed,	  resulting	   in	   the	   unavailability	   of	   the	   outputs	   of	   that	   activity.	   If	   these	   outputs	   again	  represent	  inputs	  of	  other	  activities	  within	  the	  process	  model,	  those	  activities	  may	  not	  be	  executed	   which	   as	   a	   consequence	   renders	   the	   generated	   products	   or	   services	  unavailable.	   The	   authors	   demonstrated	   a	   clearly	   structured	   and	   simple	   approach	   to	  process	   risk	   modelling	   by	   means	   of	   existing	   modelling	   elements	   of	   a	   Petri	   net	  (resources,	  activation	  conditions).	  	  Suriadi	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  conducted	  a	  literature	  review	  investigating	  the	  current	  research	  in	  the	  field	  of	  risk-­‐based	  business	  process	  modelling.	  They	  noted	  that	  20	  of	  the	  27	  closely	  investigated	   papers	   worked	   on	   approaches	   to	   a	   model-­‐based	   documentation	   of	   risk	  information,	  whereas	   18	   papers	   tried	   to	   extend	   process	  models	   by	   limited	   additional	  process	   risk	   analysis	   capabilities.	   As	   a	   conclusion	   of	   their	   literature	   review,	   they	  formulated	   future	   research	  needs	   in	   enhancing	  process	  modelling	  with	   risk	  modelling	  techniques,	  e.g.	  Bayesian	  Networks.	  	  	  This	  paper	  adheres	  to	  their	  suggestion	  and	  presents	  an	  approach	  to	  mapping	  a	  process-­‐model	   onto	   a	   Bayesian	   network,	   which	   henceforth	   is	   denoted	   as	   a	   Bayesian	   Process	  Network	  (BPN).	   In	  the	  second	  section,	   it	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  model	  of	  Event-­‐driven	  Process	  Chains	  (EPC)	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  network.	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  an	  approach	  to	  transforming	  the	  EPC	  process	  model	  into	  a	  homomorphous	  Bayesian	   network	   will	   be	   described.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   every	   element	   of	   the	   process	  model	   is	   mapped	   onto	   a	   random	   variable.	   Process	   risks	   are	   represented	   as	   random	  variables	  deviating	  from	  their	  reference	  states.	   It	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  between	   the	  process	  elements	   can	  be	  mapped	  onto	   the	  Bayesian	  process	  network	   by	   appropriate	   specifications	   of	   conditional	   probabilities.	   The	   fourth	   section	  will	   show	  how	   the	  Bayesian	  process	  network	   can	  be	  applied	   to	   a	   systemic	  analysis	  of	  process	  risks.	  	  	  
2.	  	   Structure	  of	  EPC	  Models	  and	  Bayesian	  Networks	  	  For	   the	   following	   explanations,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   a	   process	   model	   according	   to	   the	  method	  of	  Event-­‐driven	  Process	  Chain	  (EPC)	   is	  given.	  Event-­‐driven	  process	  chains	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  world's	  leading	  ERP	  system	  SAP.	  Along	  with	  the	  Business	  Process	  Modelling	   Notation	   (BPMN),	   it	   has	   found	   widespread	   use	   and	   acceptance	   within	   the	  process	  modelling	  community.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  EPC	  focuses	  on	  the	  event-­‐oriented	  control	  flow	  of	  processes.	  The	  control	  flow	   unfolds	   the	   flow	   logic	   of	   the	   process	   represented	   by	   the	   temporal	   and	   causal	  arrangement	  of	  events	  and	  functions	  within	  the	  process	  model.	  An	  event	  represents	  an	  instantiated	  property	  of	  one	  or	  more	  information	  objects	  on	  which	  the	  further	  process	  flow	  depends.	  An	   information	  object	   is	   a	   semantically	  descriptive	  and	   identifiable	   fact	  about	   the	   process	   environment.	   A	   function	   represents	   a	   task	   whose	   execution	   is	  triggered	  by	  events	  and	  which	  causes	  events	  again.	  If	  an	  event	  is	  caused	  by	  an	  individual	  function	  or	  a	  function	  is	  caused	  by	  an	  individual	  event,	  the	  flow	  elements	  are	  connected	  with	  each	  other	  by	  an	  arc	  directed	  from	  the	  cause	  to	  the	  effect	  (Keller	  et	  al.	  1992).	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If	  multiple	  events	  can	  be	  generated	  by	  a	  function,	  an	  AND,	  OR,	  or	  XOR	  operator	  indicates	  whether	  every	  event,	  at	  least	  one	  event	  or	  exactly	  one	  event	  is	  generated.	  The	  function	  is	  connected	   to	   the	   operator	   by	   an	   arrow	   pointing	   to	   the	   operator.	   The	   operator	   is	  connected	   to	   the	   consequence	   events	   by	   arrows	  pointing	   to	   the	   respective	   events.	   An	  event	  triggering	  each	  function	  of	  a	  set	  of	  subsequent	  functions	  can	  be	  modelled	  using	  the	  AND	  operator	  (Keller	  et	  al.	  1992,	  pp.	  13-­‐15).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  at	  least	  one	  or	  exactly	  one	  of	  the	  following	  functions	  is	  triggered	  by	  an	  event,	  an	  additional	  function	  has	  to	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	  process	  model,	  whose	  task	  is	  to	  decide	  which	  of	  the	  following	  functions	  will	  be	  triggered.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  decision	  function	  creates	  a	  start	  event	  for	  each	  of	  the	  following	   functions,	   which	   is	   directly	   connected	   to	   the	   corresponding	   subsequent	  function	  by	  an	  arrow	  pointing	  to	  the	  function.	  If	  the	  occurrence	  of	  an	  individual	  event	  is	  caused	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   several	   functions,	   AND,	   OR,	   or	   XOR	   operators	   specify	  whether	   the	   event	   is	   generated	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   all,	   at	   least	   one,	   or	   exactly	   one	  function,	   respectively.	  Likewise,	   this	   technique	   is	  used	   for	  modelling	   the	   interaction	  of	  events	  triggering	  one	  subsequent	  function.	  By	  interconnecting	  operators,	  complex	  effect	  hierarchies	  can	  be	  created	  (Scheer	  1998,	  p.	  126).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  modelling	  the	  control	  flow,	  an	  extended	  concept	  of	  Event-­‐driven	  Process	  Chains	   allows	   for	   a	   representation	   of	   the	   organisational	   units	   executing	   a	   function	  (organisational	  flow),	  the	  objectives	  to	  be	  achieved	  (target	  flow),	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  be	  consumed	  and	  produced	  (product	  and	  service	  flow),	  the	  resources	  to	  be	  consumed	  (resources	   flow),	   and	   information	  objects	   to	   be	   evaluated	   and	   generated	   (information	  flow).	  All	   these	  process	   objects	   are	   represented	  by	   specific	   symbols	   and	   connected	   to	  the	   associated	   functions	   by	   arrows	   pointing	   to	   the	   generated	   objects	   or	   the	   resource	  consuming	   functions	   in	   order	   to	   clarify	   the	   causal	   relationships	   (Scheer	  2002,	   pp.	   18-­‐31).	   After	   the	   notion	   ‘process’	   has	   been	   explained	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   EPC	   model,	   a	  corresponding	  definition	  of	  a	  process	  risk	  an	  be	  derived.	  	  A	  process	  risk	  refers	  to	  a	  possible	  but	  undesirable	  deviation	  of	  a	  function,	  event,	  or	  object	  from	   its	   reference	   state	   represented	   in	   the	   process	  model.	   The	   possible	   deviations	   of	  functions,	  events,	  and	  objects	  from	  their	  reference	  states	  are	  denoted	  as	  functional	  risks,	  event	  risks,	  and	  object	  risks,	  respectively.	  A	  function	  risk	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  risk	  of	  events	  triggering	   the	   function	  or	  by	   the	  risks	  of	  objects	   to	  be	  consumed	  by	   the	   function.	  As	  a	  consequence	   a	   function	   risk	   can	   cause	   the	   risks	   of	   events	   or	   objects	   to	   be	   created	   by	  function.	  	  Such	   a	   system-­‐oriented	   definition	   of	   risk,	   which	   takes	   into	   account	   not	   only	   the	   risk	  event	   itself	  but	  the	  whole	  cause	  and	  effect	  chain	   is	  a	  prerequisite	   for	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	   of	   risks	   and	   thus	   for	   a	   reliable	   risk	   assessment	   and	   effective	   risk	  management.	  ‘The	  ability	  to	  decompose	  a	  risk	  problem	  into	  chains	  of	  interrelated	  events	  and	   variables	   should	   make	   risk	   analysis	   more	   meaningful,	   practical	   and	   coherent	  (Fenton	  and	  Neil	  2013,	  p.	  45).	  A	  function,	  event,	  or	  object	  risk	  is	  rated	  by	  risk	  measures	  reflecting	   the	   level	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   possible	   deviations	   from	   the	   respective	  reference	  state.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  can	  be	  favourable	  deviations	  of	  a	  process	  as	  well,	  which	   ought	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   process	   opportunities.	  Whether	   there	   are	   such	  opportunities	  depends	  on	  what	  process	  state	  is	  represented	  as	  the	  reference	  state.	  If	  the	  reference	   state	   comprises	   optimal	   process	   conditions	   only,	   this	   by	  definition	   excludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  favourable	  deviations.	  Thus,	  all	  possible	  deviations	  have	  to	  be	  rated	  as	  process	   risks.	   In	   order	   to	   keep	   further	   explanations	   simple,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	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process	   model	   represents	   the	   optimal	   process	   conditions	   and	   all	   deviations	   are	  unfavourable.	  	  A	  Bayesian	  network	  is	  an	  acyclic	  directed	  graph.	  Every	  node	  of	  this	  graph	  corresponds	  to	  a	  random	  variable	  and	  the	  directed	  arcs	  represent	  statistical	  dependencies	  between	  random	   variables.	   In	   the	   further	   explanations,	   random	   variables	   are	   denoted	   by	  uppercase	   letters,	  whereas	   their	   states	   are	   denoted	   by	   lowercase	   letters.	   The	   state	  𝑒!	  represents	   the	   reference	   state	   of	   a	   binary	   random	   variable	   E	   while	   the	   state	  𝑒!	  represents	   its	   risk	   event.	   The	   distribution	   of	   each	   random	   variable	  E	   of	   the	   Bayesian	  network	  is	  specified	  by	  a	  probability	  distribution	  𝑝 𝐸 𝑝𝑎 𝐸 ,	  where	  𝑝𝑎 𝐸 	  denotes	  the	  parents	  of	  E.	  If	  a	  random	  variable	  has	  no	  parents,	  its	  probability	  distribution	  is	  specified	  for	  𝑝𝑎 𝐸 =    .	  The	  Bayesian	  network	  represents	  the	  joint	  probability	  distribution	  of	  all	  random	   variables	   E,	   which	   can	   be	   computed	   by	   multiplying	   all	   given	   probabilities	  𝑝 𝐸 𝑝𝑎 𝐸 	  (Pearl	  2009,	  pp.	  13-­‐15).	  	  A	  causal	  Bayesian	  network	  is	  a	  Bayesian	  network	  in	  which	  the	  directed	  arcs	  represent	  direct	   causal	   relations	   between	   the	   directly	   connected	   random	   variables.	   Thus,	   two	  random	  variables	  C	  and	  E	  are	  connected	  directly	  by	  an	  arc	  directed	   from	  C	   to	  E	   if	  and	  only	   if	   C	   is	   a	   direct	   cause	   of	   E.	   A	   Bayesian	   network,	   which	   is	   solely	   based	   on	   causal	  relations,	   represents	   the	   joint	   probability	   distribution	   of	   the	   random	   variables	   by	   a	  minimum	  set	  of	  arcs	  and	  thus	  by	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  conditional	  probabilities	  to	  be	  specified.	   In	   addition,	   an	   estimation	   of	   the	   probabilities	   is	   more	   convenient	   for	   the	  domain	   experts	   than	   for	   non-­‐causal	   relationships	   because	   of	   their	   interpretation	   as	  probabilities	  of	  risk	  effects.	  Moreover,	  the	  dependency	  relationships,	  provided	  they	  are	  of	   causal	   nature,	   can	   be	   exploited	   to	   assess	   the	   effects	   of	   risk	   mitigation	   measures	  (Kjærulff	   and	   Madsen	   2013,	   pp.	   24-­‐25,	   p.	   31;	   Nadkarni	   and	   Shenoy	   2001	   p.	   486;	  Nadkarni	  and	  Shenoy	  2004	  p.	  260;	  Pearl	  2009,	  p.	  21-­‐25).	  	  	  	  
3.	   Mapping	  the	  Process	  Model	  onto	  a	  Bayesian	  network	  	  
3.1	   Mapping	  the	  Process	  Elements	  onto	  Random	  Variables	  	  The	   events,	   functions,	   and	   objects	   of	   a	   process	   model	   are	   represented	   by	   random	  variables	  E.	  Their	  first	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑦𝑒𝑠	  indicates	  that	  the	  variable	  is	  in	  its	  reference	  state,	  the	  second	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑛𝑜	  represents	  all	  undesirable	  deviations	  from	  the	  reference	  state.	  If	   an	  event,	   a	   function,	   or	   an	  object	   can	  be	   in	  k	   different	   states,	  which	  are	  not	   equally	  desirable,	  this	  situation	  is	  represented	  by	  k	  reference	  states	  𝑒!,… , 𝑒! .	  Likewise,	  risks	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  l	  different	  states	  𝑒!!!,… , 𝑒!!! ,	  should	  it	  be	  necessary	  for	  risk	  analysis	  purposes	   to	   differentiate	   the	   possible	   deviations	   by	   type	   or	   size.	   To	   keep	   further	  explanations	   simple,	   it	   is	   assumed,	   that	   each	   event,	   function,	   and	   object	   can	   be	  represented	   by	   two	   states	   only,	   one	   reference	   state	   and	   one	   risk	   state.	   In	   order	   to	  achieve	   an	   isomorphic	   Bayesian	   Process	   Network,	   operators	   are	   also	   mapped	   onto	  random	  variables.	  	  	  Those	  operators	  that	  merge	  the	  control	  flow	  are	  mapped	  onto	  binary	  random	  variables	  
E	  with	  reference	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑦𝑒𝑠	  indicating	  that	  the	  operator	  has	  successfully	  merged	  the	  control	   flows	  together,	  and	  risk	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑛𝑜	  indicating	  that	  merging	  the	  control	   flows	  failed.	   By	   representing	   the	   operators	   as	   random	   variables,	   this	   renders	   possible	   an	  integration	  of	  organisational	  failures	  in	  merging	  information	  or	  coordinating	  delegated	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responsibilities	   into	   the	   Bayesian	   Process	   Network.	   The	   transformation	   of	   operators	  that	  distribute	   the	   control	   flow	  requires	  a	  differentiated	  approach.	  The	  only	   reference	  state	  of	  an	  AND	  operator	  E	  indicates	  a	  distribution	  of	  the	  control	  flow	  to	  all	  subsequent	  events	  or	  functions.	  Therefore	  AND	  operators	  are	  mapped	  onto	  binary	  random	  variables	  with	   the	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑦𝑒𝑠	  representing	   the	  reference	  state	  and	  and	  the	  risk	  state	  𝑒! = 𝑛𝑜	  representing	   that	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   control	   flow	   failed.	   Distributing	   XOR	   and	  OR	  variables	  have	  n	   and	  2! − 1	  possible	  distributions	  of	   the	  control	   flow	  on	  n	   subsequent	  events,	  respectively.	  These	  distributions	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  states	  𝑒!,… , 𝑒!	  and	  the	  states	  𝑒!,… , 𝑒!!!!,	  respectively.	  In	  case	  the	  preceding	  process	  element	  is	  in	  its	  risk	  state,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  designated	  distribution	  can	  fail.	  In	  order	  to	  integrate	  these	  kinds	  of	   operator	   risks,	   risk	   states	  𝑒!!! 	  and	  𝑒!! 	  are	   added	   to	   the	   XOR	   and	   OR	   variables,	  respectively.	  	  It	   follows	   from	   the	   transformation	   of	   operators	   that	   a	   conditional	   probability	   of	   each	  event	  that	  succeeds	  a	  distributing	  XOR	  or	  OR	  variable	  has	  to	  be	  specified	  for	  each	  of	  the	  𝑒!	  and	  𝑒!! 	  reference	  states,	  respectively.	  Thus,	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  event	  must	  also	  be	  specified	  under	   the	  condition	   that	   the	  preceding	  XOR	  or	  OR	  variable	  has	  established	  a	  distribution	  of	  the	  control	   flow	  not	  having	  considered	  this	  event.	  Under	  this	  condition,	  neither	   the	   reference	  nor	   the	   risk	   state	   of	   the	   event	   is	   to	   occur,	  which	  means	   that	   all	  probabilities	   have	   to	   be	   0.	   As	   an	   axiom	   of	   probability	   theory	   requires	   the	   sum	   of	   the	  probabilities	   of	   all	   occurrences	   of	   a	   random	   variable	   to	   equal	   1,	   this	   would	   cause	   a	  problem.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  around	  this	  problem,	  it	  is	  suggested	  to	  adhere	  to	  an	  approach	  to	  modelling	   impossible	   paths	   within	   Bayesian	   networks	   presented	   by	   Fenton	   and	   Neil	  (2013,	  pp.	  190-­‐192).	   If	  an	  artificial	  state	  NA	  is	  added	  to	  the	  event	  variable,	  which	  gets	  assigned	   a	   probability	   of	   1	   under	   the	   condition	   of	   the	   previous	   XOR	   or	   OR	   variable	  distributing	   the	   control	   flow	   to	   other	   events,	   a	   probability	   of	   0	   to	   both	   the	   reference	  state	  and	  the	  risk	  state	  can	  be	  assigned	  without	  violating	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  axiom	  of	  probability	  theory.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  solution,	  a	  state	  NA	  has	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  all	  variables	   that	   are	   successors	   of	   the	   XOR	   and	   OR	   variable	   and	   which	   assigned	   a	  probability	  of	  1	  if	  one	  of	  its	  parents	  is	  in	  state	  NA.	  	  	  
3.2	   Mapping	  Causal	  Mechanisms	  to	  Conditional	  Probabilities	  	  Because	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  desirable	  properties	  of	  a	  causal	  Bayesian	  network,	  the	  Bayesian	   Process	   Network	   has	   to	   be	   constructed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   causal	   relations	  between	   random	   variables.	   According	   to	   Pearl	   (2009,	   p.	   43),	   a	   causal	   structure	   of	  variables	   V	   is	   ‘a	   directed	   acyclic	   graph	   (DAG)	   in	   which	   each	   node	   corresponds	   to	   a	  distinct	  element	  of	  V,	  and	  each	  link	  represents	  a	  direct	  functional	  relationship	  between	  the	   corresponding	   variables’.	   The	   graphical	   process	   model	   of	   event-­‐driven	   process	  chains	   will	   provide	   the	   causal	   structure	   for	   the	   Bayesian	   Process	   Network	   if	   the	  following	  requirements	  are	  met.	  	  As	  a	  Bayesian	  network	  has	  no	  cycles,	  feedback	  loops	  within	  the	  process	  flow	  cannot	  be	  mapped	  to	  a	  properly	  structured	  Bayesian	  network.	  Possible	  solutions	  are	  provided	  by	  mapping	   the	  process	   loops	  onto	   sequential	   sub-­‐processes	   or	  by	   aggregating	   the	   loops	  into	  a	  single	  process	  function	  (Nadkarni	  and	  Shenoy	  2001,	  p.	  488).	  	  Process	  objects,	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  both	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  a	  function	  must	  be	  represented	  by	  two	  different	  random	  variables,	  so	  that	  even	  in	  this	  situation,	  a	  cycle	  is	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avoided.	   The	   random	   variables	   which	   are	   representing	   the	   properties	   of	   an	   object	  consumed	   is	   linked	   by	   an	   arc	   directed	   to	   the	   function	   while	   a	   random	   variable	  representing	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  object	  generated	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  function	  by	  an	  arc	  directed	  to	  the	  object	  variable.	  An	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Scheer	  (2002,	  p.	  31)	  for	  the	  object	   ‘environmental	   data’,	  which	   is	  modified	   by	   the	   function	   and	   thus	   consumed	   as	  well	   as	   generated.	   In	   case	   objects	   of	   the	   process	   model	   (such	   as	   the	   responsible	  organisational	  units	  or	  resources	  consumed)	  are	  connected	  by	  undirected	  edges,	  these	  have	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   arcs	   directed	   to	   the	   function	   variable.	   After	   applying	   these	  adjustments,	   the	  graphic	  structure	  of	   the	  process	  model	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	   the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	   	  The	  causal	  mechanism	  between	  a	  random	  variable	  E	  and	  its	  direct	  causes	  𝑝𝑎 𝐸 = 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! 	  can	  be	  specified	  by	  the	  conditional	  probabilities	  𝑝 𝐸 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! 	  as	  explained	  below.	  	  A	  random	  variable	  E,	  representing	  a	  function,	  a	  generated	  event,	  or	  a	  produced	  object,	  is	  assumed	   to	   be	   in	   the	   reference	   state	  𝑒!  if	   and	   only	   if	   any	   of	   its	   causes	  𝐶! 	  is	   in	   the	  reference	  state.	  If	  at	  least	  one	  cause	  is	  in	  its	  risk	  state	  and	  all	  other	  causes	  are	  assuming	  their	   reference	   states,	   then	   E	   also	   assumes	   its	   risk	   state.	   This	   corresponds	   to	   the	  assumption	   that	   functions	   represent	   production	   functions	   with	   factors	   as	   perfect	  complements.	   Substitutional	   relationships	   can	   be	   easily	   specified	   by	   probabilities	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! > 0	  if	  one	  or	  more	  𝐶! 	  are	  assuming	  their	  risk	  states	  and	  all	  other	  𝐶! 	  (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖)	  are	  in	  their	  reference	  states.	  Provided	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  is	  in	  the	  state	  NA,	  
E	  also	  assumes	  the	  state	  NA.	  An	  event	  following	  a	  distributing	  OR	  or	  XOR	  variable	  will	  assume	  its	  reference	  state	  only	  if	  the	  OR	  or	  the	  XOR	  variable	  assigns	  the	  control	  flow	  to	  the	   respective	   event.	   In	   cases	   that	   the	   distributing	  OR	   or	   XOR	   variable	   interrupts	   the	  control	  flow,	  which	  means	  being	  itself	  in	  its	  risk	  state,	  every	  subsequent	  event	  assumes	  its	  risk	  state	  as	  well.	  If	  the	  distributing	  variable	  interrupts	  the	  control	  flow	  or	  is	  in	  state	  NA,	  the	  subsequent	  functions	  or	  events	  assume	  state	  NA,	  likewise.	  	  Random	   variables	  E	   representing	   distributing	   operators	   have	   a	   single	   cause	  C,	  whose	  state	  determines	  whether	  the	  control	  flow	  is	  directed	  to	  the	  following	  random	  variables	  or	   interrupted.	   Forwarding	   will	   take	   place	   if	   C	   is	   in	   the	   reference	   state	   while	   an	  interruption	  occurs	  if	  C	  is	  in	  its	  risk	  state.	  For	  a	  distributing	  XOR	  and	  OR	  variable	  there	  are	   n	   and	  2! − 1	  options	   to	   distribute	   the	   control	   flow	   to	   the	   subsequent	   process	  elements,	  respectively.	  The	  probabilities	  assigned	  to	  the	  options	  of	  a	  XOR	  or	  OR	  variable	  have	   to	   meet	   the	   conditions	   𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐!   +,… ,+  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 1 	  or	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐!   +,… ,+  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒!!!! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 1,	   respectively.	   An	   interruption	   of	   the	  control	   flow	   is	   distributed	   to	   the	   subsequent	   process	   elements	   likewise.	   The	   n	   and	  2! − 1	  options	   to	   distributing	   an	   interruption	   of	   the	   control	   flow	   to	   the	   following	  process	   elements	   are	   represented	   by	   the	   states	  𝑒!!! ,	   ...,	  𝑒!! 	  and	  𝑒!! ,	   ...,	  𝑒!⋅(!!!!) ,	  respectively.	  Since	   the	  subsequent	  process	  elements	  are	  affected	  by	  an	   interruption	  of	  the	  control	  flow	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  control	  flow	  would	  have	  been	  otherwise	  distributed	  to	  them,	   the	   same	   probabilities	  will	   be	   applied	   to	   the	  mechanism	  of	   distributing	   control	  flow	   interruptions.	   For	   the	   concerning	   probabilities	   it	   holds	   𝐸 = 𝑒!!! 𝐶 = 𝑐! =  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! ,… ,𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒!! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐!    and 𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒!! 𝐶 = 𝑐! =    𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! ,… ,𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒!⋅(!!!!) 𝐶 = 𝑐! =     𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒!!!! 𝐶 = 𝑐! ,	   respectively.	  Since	  for	  a	  distributing	  AND	  variable	  E	  there	  is	  only	  one	  option	  to	  distribute	  the	  control	  flow	   to	   the	   subsequent	   process	   elements,	   its	   mechanism	   of	   action,	   assuming	  𝑐! 	  is	  representing	   the	   reference	   state	   and	  𝑐! 	  is	   representing	   the	   risk	   state	   of	   C,	   can	   be	  specified	   by	   𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 1 ,	   𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 0 ,   𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 0 	  and	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶 = 𝑐! = 1.	  The	  distributing	  operator	  assumes	  state	  NA	   if	   its	  predecessor	   is	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in	   state	   NA.	   The	   idea	   of	   specifying	   probabilities	   of	   XOR	   distributions	   within	   the	   EPC	  process	  model	  was	  already	  indicated	  by	  Scheer	  (1995,	  pp.	  52-­‐53).	  	  For	   a	   merging	   operator	   variable,	   the	   conditional	   probabilities	   depend	   on	   the	   type	   of	  operator.	   For	   a	   random	   variable	   E	   representing	   a	   merging	   XOR	   operator,	   we	   have	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! = 1	  if	   there	   is	   exactly	  one	  𝐶! 	  in	   its	   reference	   state	  and	  all	  other	  𝐶! 	  	  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 	  are	  in	  state	  NA.	  The	  XOR	  variable	  will	  assume	  its	  risk	  state	  𝐸 = 𝑒!	  if	  𝐶! = 𝑐!! 	  holds	  for	  at	  least	  one	  cause	  𝐶! .	  The	  condition	  NA,	  i.e.	  the	  state	  𝑒!,	  will	  be	  assumed	  if	  all	  causes	  are	   in	   the	   state	   NA	   or	   more	   than	   one	   cause	   is	   in	   the	   reference	   state.	   For	   a	   random	  variable	  E	   representing	   a	  merging	   OR-­‐Operator,	  we	   have	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! = 1	  if	   at	  least	  one	  and	  less	  than	  n	  causes	  assume	  their	  reference	  state	  and	  all	  other	  causes	  are	  in	  the	  state	  NA.	  It	  assumes	  its	  risk	  state	  𝐸 = 𝑒!	  if	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  𝐶! 	  is	  in	  the	  risk	  state	  𝐶! = 𝑐!! 	  and	  all	  other	  causes	  are	  either	  in	  the	  reference	  state	  or	  in	  the	  NA	  state.	  The	  state	  𝑒!=	  NA	  will	  be	  assumed	  if	  all	  the	  causes	  are	  in	  state	  NA	  or	  in	  the	  reference	  state.	  A	  merging	  AND	  variable	  E	  will	  assume	  its	  reference	  state	   if	  all	   its	  direct	  causes	  𝐶!,… ,𝐶!	  assume	   their	   reference	   states	   as	   well,	   i.e.	   for	   binary	   variables	   E	   we	   have	  𝑝 𝐸 =𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! = 1	  for	  𝐶! = 𝑐!!,… ,𝐶! = 𝑐!! 	  and	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! = 0	  otherwise.	   For	   E	  being	  in	  the	  risk	  state	  𝑒!	  it	  holds	  𝑝 𝐸 = 𝑒! 𝐶!,… ,𝐶! = 1,	  if	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  𝐶! 	  are	  in	  the	  risk	  state	  𝑐!! 	  and	  all	  other	  𝐶! 	  (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖	  )	  are	  in	  the	  reference	  state	  𝑐!! .	  Provided	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  is	  in	  state	  NA,	  the	  AND-­‐Variable	  will	  assume	  the	  state	  NA	  as	  well.	  	  After	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  process	  network	  has	  been	  established	  and	  discussed,	  it	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  model	   can	  be	  used	   for	  a	   systemic	  analysis	  of	  process	  risks.	  	  	  
4.	   Process	  Risk	  Analysis	  by	  Means	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network	  	  
4.1	   Integration	  of	  Process	  Risks	  	  According	   to	   the	  risk	  definition	  suggested	   in	  section	  2,	  a	  process	  risk	   is	  a	  possible	  but	  undesirable	   deviation	   of	   events,	   functions,	   or	   objects	   from	   their	   reference	   states.	   In	   a	  BPN	   the	   reference	   state	   as	   well	   as	   possible	   deviations	   are	   represented	   by	   states	   of	  random	   variables.	   If	   all	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   process	  model	   and	   the	   relations	   amongst	  them	   are	   mapped	   onto	   the	   Bayesian	   Process	   Network	   according	   to	   the	   procedure	  explained	  above,	  all	  process	  risks	  must	  be	  caused	  by	  unavailability	  of	  objects	  or	  events	  generated	  outside	  the	  process	  (exogenous	  objects	  and	  events).	  An	  object	  or	  an	  event	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  unavailable	  if	  at	  least	  one	  of	  its	  necessary	  properties	  is	  not	  present	  (see	  similar	  Betz	  et	  al.	  2011,	  p.	  352).	  	  Figure	  1	  depicts	  an	  event-­‐driven	  process	  chain	  of	  a	  goods	   inwards	  process,	  which	  has	  been	  mapped	  onto	  a	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	  It	  serves	  as	  an	  example	  to	  our	  following	  discussions.	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Figure	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  EPC	  model	  of	  a	  goods	  receiving	  process	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random	   variables	   of	   the	   BPN	   can	   be	   computed.	   The	   probability	   values	   of	   reference	  states	   (𝑒!),	   risk	   states	   (𝑒!),	   and	  NA	  states	   (𝑒!)	  of	   all	   events,	   objects,	   and	   functions	  are	  presented	   in	   the	   column	   denoted	   by	   ‘Risk-­‐free	   Process’	   of	   Table	   1.	   With	   the	   given	  assumptions	  about	  the	  causal	  mechanisms,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  probabilities	  of	  the	  risk	  states	  of	  each	  process	  element	  must	  equal	  zero.	  	  In	   the	   second	   step,	   the	   probabilities	   of	   non-­‐occurrence	   of	   the	   start	   event	   ‘Goods	  received’	   (𝐸!)	   as	   well	   as	   probabilities	   of	   unavailability	   of	   the	   objects	   Cutter	   (𝐸!),	  Delivery	  note	   (𝐸!),	  Return	   form	   (𝐸!),	   and	  ERP	  system	   (𝐸!")	   are	   estimated.	   In	   case	  an	  immediate	   estimate	   of	   probabilities	   by	   domain	   experts	   is	   deemed	   impossible	   or	  inconvenient,	   the	   BPN	   can	   be	   extended	   by	   additional	   random	   variables	   representing	  possible	  causes	  for	  non-­‐occurrence	  of	  the	  start	  event	  or	  causes	  for	  non-­‐availability	  of	  the	  resources.	   As	   such,	   these	   random	   variables	   can	   be	   perceived	   as	   risk	   factors	   for	   the	  respective	  risks.	   It	   is	  assumed	  that	   it	  might	  be	  easier	   for	  domain	  experts	   to	  assess	   the	  probabilities	  of	   risk	  states	  under	  specific	   conditions	  of	   the	  risk	   factors	   than	   to	  give	  an	  immediate	  estimate	  of	  an	  unconditional	  probability,	  which	  can	  actually	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  weighted	   average	   of	   the	   conditional	   probabilities.	   Table	   1	   shows	   the	   assumed	  probability	  estimates	  for	  the	  risk	  states	  (𝑒!)	  of	  random	  variables	  1,	  2,	  6,	  9,	  and	  13	  in	  the	  column	  denoted	  by	  ‘Process	  with	  risks’.	  	  	  
Table	  1	   Probabilities	  of	  process	  element	  states	  with/without	  process	  risks	  	  	  	   No.	   Random	  variable	   Risk-­‐free	  process	  	   Process	  with	  risks	  	  𝑒!	   	  𝑒!	   	  𝑒!	   	  𝑒!	   	  𝑒!	   	  𝑒!	  1	   Goods	  received	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,998	   0,002	   	  2	   Cutter	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,970	   0,030	   	  3	   Unpack	  goods	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,968	   0,032	   	  4	   Packaging	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,968	   0,032	   	  5	   Goods	  inspection	  notified	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,968	   0,032	   	  6	   Delivery	  note	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0.980	   0,020	   	  7	   Inspect	  goods	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,949	   0,051	   	  8	   Goods	  are	  not	  released	   0,100	   0,000	   0,900	   0,095	   0,005	   0,900	  9	   Return	  form	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,970	   0,030	   	  10	   Return	  goods	   0,100	   0,000	   	   0,092	   0,008	   0,900	  11	   Goods	  are	  returned	   0,100	   0,000	   0,900	   0,092	   0,008	   0,900	  12	   Goods	  are	  released	   0,900	   0,000	   0,100	   0,854	   0,046	   0,100	  13	   ERP	  system	   1,000	   0,000	   	   0,980	   0,020	   	  14	   Book	  goods	  receipt	   0,900	   0,000	   0,100	   0,837	   0,063	   0,100	  15	   Warehouse	  notified	   0,900	   0,000	   0,100	   0,837	   0,063	   0,100	  16	   Storing	  area	  selected	   0,900	   0,000	   0,100	   0,837	   0,063	   0,100	  17	   High	  rack	  storage	   0,540	   0,000	   0,460	   0,502	   0,038	   0,460	  18	   Store	  goods	  in	  high	  rack	   0,540	   0,000	   0,460	   0,502	   0,038	   0,460	  20	   Floor	  storage	   0,360	   0,000	   0,640	   0,335	   0,025	   0,640	  19	   Store	  goods	  on	  floor	   0,360	   0,000	   0,640	   0,335	   0,025	   0,640	  21	   Goods	  are	  stored	   0,900	   0,000	   0,100	   0,837	   0,063	   0,100	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The	   direct	   and	   indirect	   risk	   impacts	   on	   the	   process	   are	   reflected	   by	   the	   calculated	  probabilities	  for	  risk	  conditions	  (𝑒!)	  of	  the	  other	  process	  elements,	  which	  are	  reported	  likewise	   in	   the	   column	   ‘Process	  with	  Risks’.	  Thus,	   risk	  probabilities	  of	  process	   events,	  functions,	  or	  objects	  can	  be	  obtained	  on	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network,	  which	   otherwise	   needing	   to	   be	   elicited	   from	   domain	   experts	   as	   non-­‐transparent	   and	  potentially	  inconsistent	  estimates.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  without	  a	  process	  risk	  model,	  an	  expert	  could	  immediately	  estimate	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ‘Inspect	  Goods’	  function	  (state	  𝑒!	  of	  random	  variable	  7)	  or	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  ordered	  goods	  are	  unavailable	  (state	  𝑒!	  of	  random	  variable	  21).	  	  	  	  
4.2	   Systemic	  Analysis	  of	  Process	  Risks	  	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  capitalise	  on	  process	  risk	  analysis,	  a	  suitable	  process	  risk	  model	  has	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  ‘What	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  set	  of	  process	  risk	  causes?’	  and	  ‘What	  are	  the	  causes	  of	  a	   set	  of	  process	   risk	  effects?’.	  As	  a	  Bayesian	  process	  network	  represents	  the	   joint	   probability	   of	   all	   random	   variables	   enclosed,	   these	   pertinent	   questions	   of	  process	   risk	   analysis	   can	   easily	   be	   answered	   by	   computing	   suitable	   a	   posteriori	  probabilities.	  	  	  An	   initial	   cause	   and	   effect	   analysis	   was	   already	   conducted	   within	   the	   phase	   of	  constructing	  the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  direct	  cause-­‐effect	  mechanisms	  between	  the	  random	  variables.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  ask	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  set	  of	  states	  of	  potential	  causes	  𝐶!,… ,𝐶!	  on	  a	  risk	  effect	  variable	  𝐸! ,	  the	  indirect	  cause	  and	  effect	   mechanisms	   can	   be	   revealed	   by	   computing	   a	   posteriori	   probabilities	  𝑝 𝐸! 𝐶!,… ,  𝐶! .	  Getting	   these	  kinds	  of	  questions	  answered	   is	  particularly	  pertinent	   in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  presumed	  effect	  of	  risk	  mitigation	  measures	  that	  aim	  at	  changing	  the	  states	   of	   the	  𝐶!,… ,𝐶! .	   Likewise,	   the	   a	   posteriori	   probabilities	  𝑝 𝐶! 𝐸!,… ,𝐸! 	  can	  elucidate	   the	   most	   likely	   causes	  𝐶! 	  of	   unfavourable	   process	   situations	   given	   by	   the	  evidence	   of	   some	   process	   elements	  𝐸!,… ,𝐸! .	   In	   what	   follows,	   both	   approaches	   to	  analysing	   process	   risks	   by	   means	   of	   the	   BPN	   will	   be	   discussed	   using	   the	   ‘Receiving	  Goods’	  process	  as	  an	  example.	  	  It	   is	   assumed	   that	   process	   management	   is	   asking	   the	   question	   of	   how	   an	   entirely	  mitigated	   risk	   of	   failing	   deliveries	   affected	   the	   ordered	   goods	   availability	   in	   the	  warehouse.	   The	   risk	   state	  𝐶! = 𝑐!!	  of	   the	   random	   variable	   ‘Goods	   received’	   and	   the	  reference	   state	  𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"	  of	   the	   random	   variable	   ‘Goods	   are	   stored’	   will	   be	   used	   as	  suitable	   indicators	   to	   compare	   the	   failure	   of	   delivery	   and	   the	   availability	   of	   ordered	  goods	  in	  the	  warehouse	  before	  and	  after	  applying	  the	  risk	  mitigation	  measure.	  The	  effect	  of	  an	  entirely	  mitigated	  risk	  of	  failing	  deliveries	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  ordered	  goods	  in	  the	  warehouse	   is	   given	   by	   the	   a	   posteriori	   probability	   of	  𝑝 𝐸!" = 𝑒!! 𝐶! = 𝑐!! 	  =	   0.838	  compared	  to	  the	  a	  priori	  probability	  before	  risk	  mitigation	  of	  𝑝 𝐸!" = 𝑒!!" 	  =	  0.837	  (see	  Table	  1).	  At	  the	  request	  of	  process	  management,	  mitigation	  actions	  that	  ensure	  a	  100%	  availability	  of	  the	  ERP	  system	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  assessed	  as	  alternative	  risk	  mitigation	  measures.	  By	   computing	  an	  a	  posteriori	  probability	  of	  𝑝 𝐸!" = 𝑒!! 𝐶!" = 𝑐!! 	  =	  0.854	   it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  measure	  is	  superior	  in	  terms	  of	  effectiveness.	  	  As	   another	   example	   of	   demonstrating	   the	   risk	   analysis	   capability	   of	   the	   Bayesian	  Process	   Network,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   someone	   has	   observed	   stock	   unavailability	   of	  ordered	   goods	   in	   the	   warehouse	   and	   asked	   about	   the	   most	   likely	   reason.	   Then,	   this	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question	   can	   be	   answered	   by	   calculating	   the	   a	   posteriori	   probabilities	   of	   a	   set	   of	  potential	   causes	  𝐶! 	  being	   in	   their	   risk	  states	  under	   the	  condition	  of	  ordered	  goods	  not	  being	  stored	  in	  the	  warehouse.	  This	  condition	  is	  equal	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  storage	  should	  be	   executed	   but	   failed	   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!" 	  or	   that	   the	   goods	   had	   to	   be	   returned,	  meaning	   the	  random	   variable	  𝐸!"	  assumes	   the	   state	   NA	   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!" .	   Possible	   exogenous	   causes	   of	  this	  risk	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  random	  variables	  1,	  2,	  6	  and	  13	  of	  the	  BPN,	   for	  which	  the	  probabilities	  of	  causing	  the	  unavailability	  of	  ordered	  goods	  are	  	  𝑝 𝐶! = 𝑐!! 𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"   ∨   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"         =	  	  	  	  1,2%	  𝑝 𝐶! = 𝑐!! 𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"   ∨   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"         =	  18,4%	  𝑝 𝐶! = 𝑐!! 𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"   ∨   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"         =	  12,3%	  𝑝 𝐶!" = 𝑐!!" 𝐸!" = 𝑒!!"   ∨   𝐸!" = 𝑒!!" =	  12,3%	  	  Thus,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  unavailability	  of	  the	  resource	  ‘Cutter’	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  cause	  of	  this	  risk.	  
	  
	  
5.	   Conclusions	  and	  Future	  Research	  	  	  In	  this	  paper	  an	  approach	  is	  presented	  to	  mapping	  a	  process	  model	  of	  the	  event-­‐driven	  process	   chain	   onto	   an	   isomorphic	   Bayesian	   network,	  which	  was	   denoted	   as	   Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	  A	  process	  risk	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  possible	  deviation	  of	  a	  process	  event,	  function,	  object,	  or	  operator	  from	  their	  reference	  states.	  It	  was	  suggested	  to	  map	  process	  events,	   functions,	   objects,	   and	   operators	   onto	   random	   variables	   that	   represent	   their	  reference	  as	  well	  as	  their	  possible	  risk	  states.	  As	  the	  links	  of	  the	  process	  model	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  causal	  relations,	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  process	  model	  could	  be	  mapped	  onto	   an	   isomorphic	   structure	   of	   the	   Bayesian	   Process	   Network.	   Assumptions	   for	   the	  probabilities	   of	   the	   conditioned	   random	   variables	   were	  made	   in	   order	   to	   specify	   the	  direct	   cause	   and	   effect	   mechanisms.	   Using	   a	   process	   example,	   the	   capability	   of	   the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network	  to	  support	  systemic	  process	  risk	  analysis	  was	  demonstrated.	  	  	  Further	   research	   opportunities	   can	   be	   considered	   in	   applying	   the	   approach	   to	   more	  complex	  process	  structures.	  The	  application	  of	  more	  sophisticated	  causal	  relationships	  than	   those	   assumed	   in	   this	   paper	   and	   the	   integration	   of	   financial	   or	   non-­‐financial	  process	   performance	   and	   risk	   indicators	   into	   the	   model	   could	   be	   other	   promising	  domains	  for	  a	  further	  development	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  Process	  Network.	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